On May 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the Quebec Attorney General’s application for leave to appeal regarding section 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“Code”), which relates to the authority of police officers to require any driver of a motor vehicle to stop1.
This follows the October 25, 2022 decision of the Quebec Superior Court, which declared this provision inoperative due to its unconstitutionality, specifically because it unjustifiably infringes rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 (“Canadian Charter”).
On October 23, 2024, this decision was unanimously upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal. We now await the position of Canada’s highest court.
What are the legal grounds of this case and what does it mean for the future?
The landmark ruling on random interceptions since 1990
In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, in an Ontario case, examined the authority of peace officers to intercept motor vehicles without first having reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed3.
The country’s highest court ruled, unanimously, that random traffic stops violate the fundamental right to protection against arbitrary detention, as enshrined in section 9 of the Canadian Charter. However, despite the Court’s recognition of the violation, five judges to four held that the infringement of this right was justified in a free and democratic society, notably due to urgent and legitimate concerns about road safety.
The Supreme Court of Canada therefore concluded that this infringement is constitutionally permitted under the Canadian Charter.
Reversal of a precedent following a case concerning racial profiling
More than thirty years after the Ladouceur decision, the Superior Court is examining the situation experienced by Mr. Luamba4, who was subjected to three random stops within just over a year. He brought his case before the court to have declared unconstitutional and inoperative the rule of law granting peace officers the power to stop a motor vehicle without reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that a traffic offence has been committed. He alleges a violation of his fundamental rights, notably raising concerns regarding racial profiling.
In this case, the court concluded that the racial profiling issue raised was “a social fact that the Supreme Court was unable to consider at the time it rendered the Ladouceur decision”5. For this reason, especially given the social context that differs significantly from that time, the Superior Court departed from the landmark 1990 ruling.
Indeed, the Superior Court did a turnaround by declaring that the rule of law granting peace officers the power to intercept without reasonable grounds, as provided in section 636 of the Code, constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights recognized protected by the Canadian Charter, “without being justified in a free and democratic society and is therefore invalid”6.
Quebec Court of Appeal upholds declaration of inoperability
The Superior Court’s decision was appealed7, and during the hearing, the Attorney General of Quebec argued, among other things, that the notion of racial profiling does not arise from a rule of law, but rather from the improper and unconscious conduct of certain peace officers. In such circumstances, he submitted that the legal basis for conducting random traffic stops could be deemed as unconstitutional.
However, according to the Court of Appeal, it is precisely the existence of a discretionary power, neither regulated nor subject to normative standards, that allows section 636 of the Code to facilitate the infiltration of racial profiling, unconsciously or not, into the daily operations of police officers. This finding justifies upholding the declaration of inoperability of section 636 of the Code and the common law rule established by Ladouceur. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Filing an application for a stay application pending the Supreme Court’s judgment
On March 31, 2025, the Court of Appeal partially stayed the enforcement8 of this declaration of inoperability, limiting it exclusively to two types of police interventions listed below, and maintaining the stay until the Supreme Court’s final judgment:
- random drug and alcohol testing9;
- random checks conducted by inspectors during road transport operations involving passengers or goods.
Now that the Supreme Court of Canada has agreed to hear this case of roadside stops without reasonable grounds, it seems that a thorough reconsideration will be unavoidable to determine whether the exercise of such discretionary power is legitimate or not, particularly in a documented context of racial profiling.
Faced with a society profoundly transformed since the Ladouceur decision, it will be very interesting to observe the court’s contemporary reasoning on this matter. The outcome of this judicial process will necessarily contribute to clarifying the applicable boundaries and guiding future police practices.
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Disclaimer: The content of this article provides only an overview of the subject and should not, under any circumstances, be construed as legal advice. Readers should not rely solely on this document to make decisions, but should seek legal advice tailored to their specific situation.
- 1.Section 636 of the Highway Safety Code confers upon peace officers the authority, in the exercise of their duties, to order any driver of a motor vehicle to bring it to a stop. Prior to the Luamaba saga, this authority was discretionary and, since 1991, required neither prior grounds nor any specific suspicion.
- 2.Canadian charter of Rights and Freedom, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B Canada ct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 de 1982 sur le Canada (R.‑U.), 1982, c. 11..
- 3.R. v. Ladouceur, [1990] 1 RCS 1257; This includes stops conducted as part of a structured program, i.e., a roadblock.
- 4.Luamba v. Procureur général du Québec, 2022 QCCS 3866.
- 5.Id., par. 561.
- 6.Id., par. 868.
- 7.Procureur général du Québec v. Luamba, 2024 QCCA 1387.
- 8.Procureur général du Québec v. Luamba, 2025 QCCA 373.
- 9.Criminal Code, LRC 1985, c. C-46, art. 320.27 (2).
Authors: Sarah Routhier, Vincent Vachon and the Transportation Law team