{"id":1864,"date":"2025-05-30T10:27:40","date_gmt":"2025-05-30T14:27:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/steinmonast.ca\/actualites\/random-police-interceptions-the-supreme-court-will-hear-the-case\/"},"modified":"2025-05-30T11:33:12","modified_gmt":"2025-05-30T15:33:12","slug":"random-police-interceptions-the-supreme-court-will-hear-the-case","status":"publish","type":"blog_post","link":"https:\/\/steinmonast.ca\/en\/news\/random-police-interceptions-the-supreme-court-will-hear-the-case\/","title":{"rendered":"Random police interceptions: the Supreme Court will hear the case"},"content":{"rendered":"

On May 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Canada granted the Quebec Attorney General’s application for leave to appeal regarding section 636 of the Highway Safety Code (\u201cCode\u201d), which relates to the authority of police officers to require any driver of a motor vehicle to stop1<\/sup>.<\/p>\n

This follows the October 25, 2022 decision of the Quebec Superior Court, which declared this provision inoperative due to its unconstitutionality, specifically because it unjustifiably infringes rights protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2<\/sup> (\u201cCanadian Charter\u201d).<\/p>\n

On October 23, 2024, this decision was unanimously upheld by the Quebec Court of Appeal. We now await the position of Canada’s highest court.<\/p>\n

What are the legal grounds of this case and what does it mean for the future?<\/p>\n

The landmark ruling on random interceptions since 1990<\/h2>\n

In 1990, the Supreme Court of Canada, in an Ontario case<\/a>, examined the authority of peace officers to intercept motor vehicles without first having reasonable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed3<\/sup>.<\/p>\n

The country\u2019s highest court ruled, unanimously, that random traffic stops violate the fundamental right<\/strong> to protection against arbitrary detention, as enshrined in section 9 of the Canadian Charter. However, despite the Court\u2019s recognition of the violation, five judges to four held that the infringement of this right was justified<\/strong> in a free and democratic society, notably due to urgent and legitimate concerns about road safety.<\/p>\n

The Supreme Court of Canada therefore concluded that this infringement is constitutionally permitted<\/strong> under the Canadian Charter.<\/p>\n

Reversal of a precedent following a case concerning racial profiling<\/h2>\n

More than thirty years after the Ladouceur decision, the Superior Court is examining the situation experienced by Mr. Luamba4<\/sup>, who was subjected to three random stops within just over a year. He brought his case before the court to have declared unconstitutional and inoperative the rule of law granting peace officers the power to stop a motor vehicle without reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that a \u00a0traffic offence has been committed. He alleges a violation of his fundamental rights, notably raising concerns regarding racial profiling.<\/p>\n

In this case, the court concluded that the racial profiling issue raised was \u201ca social fact that the Supreme Court was unable to consider at the time it rendered the Ladouceur decision\u201d5<\/sup>. For this reason, especially given the social context that differs significantly from that time, the Superior Court departed from the landmark 1990 ruling. <\/strong><\/p>\n

Indeed, the Superior Court did a turnaround by declaring that the rule of law granting peace officers the power to intercept without reasonable grounds, as provided in section 636 of the Code, constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights recognized protected by the <\/strong>Canadian Charter<\/strong><\/a>,<\/strong> \u201cwithout being justified in a free and democratic society and is therefore invalid\u201d6<\/sup>.<\/p>\n

Quebec Court of Appeal upholds declaration of inoperability<\/h2>\n

The Superior Court’s decision was appealed7<\/sup>, and during the hearing, the Attorney General of Quebec argued, among other things, that the notion of racial profiling does not arise from a rule of law, but rather from the improper and unconscious conduct of certain peace officers. In such circumstances, he submitted that the legal basis for conducting random traffic stops could be deemed as unconstitutional.<\/p>\n

However, according to the Court of Appeal, it is precisely the existence of a discretionary power, neither regulated nor subject to normative standards, that allows section 636 of the Code to facilitate the infiltration of racial profiling,<\/strong> unconsciously or not, into the daily operations of police officers. This finding justifies upholding the declaration of inoperability<\/strong> of section 636 of the Code and the common law rule established by Ladouceur. The appeal is therefore dismissed.<\/p>\n

Filing an application for a stay application pending the Supreme Court\u2019s judgment<\/h3>\n

On March 31, 2025, the Court of Appeal partially stayed the enforcement8<\/sup> of this declaration of inoperability<\/a>, limiting it exclusively to two types of police interventions listed below, and maintaining the stay until the Supreme Court\u2019s final judgment<\/strong>:<\/p>\n